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Remittances and the household’s expenditures on health 
Abstract 
This paper considers the effect of remittances on the share of health expenditures to total 
household expenditure. The main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether remittances 
are especially targeted towards household’s health in Mexico. We use a Tobit model with 
random effects and find a statistically significant effect of remittances on the proportion of 
health expenditures for households that do not have access to employment’s medical 
insurance: Our results suggest that around 10% of changes in remittances are devoted to 
health expenditure.  
Keywords: Health expenditure, Remittances, Tobit, Health related consumption. 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper analyzes the impact of transfers from remittances on health related 
consumption of Mexican households. Our data source is the National Income Expenditure 
Survey of Households of Mexico (ENIGH) for the year 2004.  The objective of the paper is to 
find if remittances have the target of attending health problems of the original families in 
Mexico and to measure this effect. For that reason we need to distinguish between the 
proportional impacts of a greater income and the extra impact of targeted transfers from 
remittances. The study of remittances allows us to observe transfers between family members 
otherwise unobservable, to study target effects even when the sender is in a different country, 
and to compare these effects with public policy. The same magnitude of remittances that were 
in order of 23,821 billion dollars  in Mexico in 2007 may generate changes in private 
investments and public policy decisions. In the same manner as Banerjee and Duflo (2007) 
ask “why the poor don’t eat more?” motivated by the observations of how the poor spend the 
marginal dollar, we ask for the effect of the marginal dollar of remittances on health 
expenditures. Health expenditure is an attractive way to study remittances because according 
to data from the Mexican Migration Project of the period 2005-2007, even when 43.3 percent 
   
of people report that the most important motive for sending remittances is food and 
sustenance, 35.8 percent consider that health expenditure is the most important reason.  
Amuedo, Sainz, and Pozo (2007, Table 1) report that 46 percent of people remitting money 
consider health expenditure to be the most important motive for sending these remittances.  
Most of the research on the relationship between remittances and health that utilize 
household data find a strong link between them. For example, Acosta, Fajnzylber and Lopez 
(2007) found that children from households that report receiving remittances tend to exhibit 
higher health outcomes than those from non-recipients in the cases of Guatemala and 
Nicaragua. Hildebrand and McKenzie (2004) study the channels through which migration 
may affect health outcomes and find evidence that migration improves child health through 
raising the health knowledge of mothers, in addition to the direct effect on health of higher 
wealth after migration. Amuedo, Sainz and Pozo (2007) also study the relationship between 
remittances and health expenditures and McKenzie (2007) discusses some of the econometric 
problems. Our strategy in looking for the target effect of remittances consists in measuring the 
effects over the share of expenditures on health, controlling for the household’s total 
expenditure per capita, which allows us to separate “income” and remittance effects.  
 National expenditure on health in Mexico was 6.5 percent of GDP, according to the 
World Health Organization (2007a), 3.0 percent of which came from government 
expenditures and 3.5 from private expenditures. Besides, the proportion of remittances on 
National Income has been increasing in Mexico through the years: from 3,673 million dollars 
in 1994 to 16,613 in 2004 according to Banco de Mexico (BANXICO, 2005).  These 
remittances are partially observed at the household level in the ENIGH as we will discuss 
later. 
Table 1 presents data about health expenditure, out-of-pocket expenditure, and 
remittances for the countries of CAFTA and Mexico. Total expenditure on health as a 
   
percentage of GDP cannot be explained by general government expenditure or by remittances 
by themselves. Out-of-pocket expenditure on health seems to be directly related to 
remittances but the relation for every country is different. In this analysis we will study 
private expenditure in health. Therefore, in this paper we measure the relationship between 
household expenditures on health and remittances as percentages of total expenditure. 
 
Table 1 
Health expenditure and remittances for selected countries. 
 
Total expenditure on 
health as % of gross 
domestic product 
(2003) 
General government 
expenditure on 
health as % of total 
expenditure on 
health (2003) 
Out-of-pocket 
expenditure as % 
of private 
expenditure on 
health (2003) 
Out-of-pocket 
expenditure as % 
of gross domestic 
product (2003)  
 
 
Remittances as % of 
gross domestic 
product 
(2005) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Costa Rica 7.3 78.8 88.7 1.4 1.8 
Dominican 
Republic 
7.0 33.2 70.8 3.3 9.1 
El Salvador 8.1 46.1 93.5 4.1 17.1 
Guatemala 5.4 60.3 91.9 3.0 9.3 
Honduras 7.1 56.5 85.8 2.6 21.2 
Mexico 6.2 46.4 94.2 3.1 2.8 
Nicaragua 7.7 48.4 95.7 3.8 16.9 
Columns (1) to (4) are from The World Health Organization (2007b, Table 2, p. 180) .Column (5) is from The Inter-
American Development Bank (2006). 
 
In order to study the relationship between health related consumption, total 
expenditure, and remittances, we use a model that is derived from a cost function, and 
implement it through a Tobit model that controls for the total expenditure per capita in the 
household, the size of the household, family composition, and other variables. This 
derivability from a cost function allows us to interpret the marginal effects as the distance to a 
threshold or as originated in a utility function.  In addition, as we require to distinguish 
between health expenditure and consumption, we use a stochastic effects model in order to 
control for different prices at the level of clusters. Exogeneity related problems are also 
discussed.  
The organization of this paper is as follows.  In the next section the data will be 
discussed paying special attention to the data on employment’s medical insurance and on 
   
remittances. Then the model is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results of the 
Tobit model. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The Data 
Our source of data is the National Income Expenditure Survey of Households of 
Mexico (ENIGH) for the year 2004.  The households’ expenditure in the ENIGH is composed 
of two parts: a monetary and a non-monetary component. The non-monetary component 
refers to expenses that are not an out-of-pocket expenditure, but are estimated expenditures 
with data about auto-consumption, gifts, labor payment in goods, and non-monetary support 
from institutions. This non-monetary component is also characterized by the identical 
correspondence between each non-monetary expense and each non-monetary income.  As the 
interest of this study is in the relationship between remittances and out-of-pocket health 
expenditures, the non-monetary component is not included.  
Given the objective of this paper, it is important to know if the households have access 
to employment’s medical insurance, since the lack of insurance could be an important motive 
for sending remittances to the household. In Mexico, the government workers and their 
children have access to employment’s medical insurance through the ISSSTE (“Instituto de 
Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado”), the private industry workers 
through the IMSS (“Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social”), and some other workers through 
their firm’s medical services. We consider a household as having access to Employment’s 
Medical Insurance (EMI) if the head of the family or the spouse have access to at least one of 
the above mentioned medical insurance institutions2. The ENIGH sample has 22,595 
households and just 31.6 % of the head of the households have access to EMI and 35.4 % if 
                                                 
2 Usually when the father or mother of a family have employment’s medical insurance in their job, their children 
also have access to it. But even if the head of the family or the spouse have access to medical insurance, this 
does not imply that other members would also have access. Therefore, this measure is only an approximation, 
but even with this broad definition we find differences in the means and in the estimated parameters of the two 
groups.  
   
we consider the head or the spouse. An alternative we use is to take the households with at 
least one household member with access to EMI (45.2 %) but it is a dimmer concept as the 
employment medical insurance of the son or daughter cannot usually be extended to their 
parents, brothers and sisters. However the results are qualitatively similar with this definition 
showing their robustness.   
Remittances. There are two issues to consider when using the information about 
remittances in Mexico. The first one is that there are big differences in the measurement of 
remittances between the information of the Banco de Mexico (BANXICO), the Central Bank 
of Mexico, and the household information collected by ENIGH, which is the database used in 
this paper. The total amount of worker remittances according to BANXICO (2008a, 2008b) in 
the quarter July – September 2004 is of 4,551 million dollars and the remittances captured by 
ENIGH in the period August – October 2004 are of 1,037 million dollars. This difference is 
huge. A discussion of BANXICO’s methodology can be found in Cervantes (2007) and recent 
discussions about BANXICO’s quality of information in Tuirán-Gutiérrez et al (2006) and in 
Cañas et al (2007). This difference is important because it is possible that the ENIGH has 
problems measuring remittances, and even when we assume that of all households who 
receive remittances the ones who admit to receive them are random, it is better to be aware 
that the results of this study cannot be safely extended to BANXICO’s data. The second issue 
is that both information sources show that some of the more industrialized States, as Distrito 
Federal, State of Mexico and Jalisco are among the most important recipients of remittances 
which indicates that this is not necessarily a rural or poverty matter.  
In Table 2 we present statistics about the average quarterly income of the household, 
the total transfers, and the transfers corresponding to remittances and social institutions, in 
pesos as well as in percentages of income. Remittances include the household income 
transfers that come from other countries excluding retirement pensions. Transfers from 
   
institutions include the household income transfers that come from governmental and non-
governmental organizations, including the programs “Oportunidades” and “Procampo” and 
income transfers for scholarships. It excludes income transfers from retirement, 
compensations, remittances, and transfers from other households. The reader will notice that 
even when remittances were measured as approximately 2.8 percent of gross domestic 
product in Table 1, when they are measured through the households in the ENIGH they only 
account for 1.9 percent of the average income. The average remittance is higher for 
households without access to employment’s medical insurance, but their average income is 
lower.  The table also contains information about transfers to the households from 
Institutions. Households with no access to employment’s medical insurance seem to have 
higher transfers from institutions on average3. 
Table2 
Average quarterly income, remittances and institutional transfers by 
household. 2004. Pesos and percentages 
 Total 
Access to employment’s  medical 
insurance by head or spouse 
  Yes No 
 Pesos 
Income  24,167.84 33,390.72 19,534.41 
Total Transfers 2,702.78 1,114.03 3,500.95 
    Remittances 461.54 92.07 646.70 
    Institutions 333.88 118.18 441.99 
 Percentages 
Income  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total Transfers 11.2 3.3 17.9 
    Remittances 1.9 0.3 3.3 
    Institutions 1.4 0.4 2.3 
Source:  the data was elaborated with information from ENIGH 2004. 
 
 
3. The Model 
In order to study the target effect of remittances on health consumption, we require a 
model that relates remittances to the share of expenditures in health, and that simultaneously 
controls for the expenditure per capita of the household as an approximation for their wealth, 
                                                 
3 ENIGH (2004) reports 22,595 household observations representing  25’561,447 households, of which 33.4  % have access to EMI. Of the 
households that have access to EMI, 2 % receive remittances and 7.2 % transfers from institutions. Considering a total of 17’027,683 
households that do not have access to EMI,  7.3 % receive remittances and 25.2 % transfers from institutions.  
   
for the size of the household to control for scale effects, for the household’s composition, and 
for other characteristics. Therefore, we specify the model as an Engel function which linearly 
relates the fraction of total household expenditures devoted to health with total expenditure 
per capita, as in Working (1943), whose advantage among the models which comply with the 
assumption of additivity was discussed by Leser (1963). A log-log model, for example, does 
not comply with this assumption. This model discussed by Deaton (1989) has been widely 
used among others such as Case and Deaton (2002), Deaton (1987), Deaton, Ruiz and Duncan 
(1989), Gibson and Rozelle (2004), Hong and Kim (2000), and  Peña and Ruiz-Castillo, 
(1998) and variants can be found in Atkinson, Gomulka and Stern (1990), Bhalotra and 
Attfield (1998), Michelini (2001), Parker and Wong (1997), and Valero-Gil (2006) for 
Mexico. The model is as follows4: 
( ) ( ) 21 2
1
ln ln ln
J
jhh
h h j h
h h jh h
npq x xw nn nx n h
zα β β η γ δ
=
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤= = + + + + + ⋅ +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠∑ ε
                                                
       (1) 
 
The left hand side of the equation is the fraction of total expenditure x on health pqh, 
where p are prices and qh quantities of “health goods” consumed by household h, pqh is 
observed but not p and qh separately, ln(x/n)h is the natural logarithm of the expenditure per 
capita of household h, nh is the size of the household, njh is the number of people of group j in 
the household, and zh are control variables such as region, marital status and sex of the head of 
the family, and the number of hours worked. The stochastic error ε has zero mean, constant 
variance, and is considered to be independently and identically distributed among households. 
Since many households do not make health expenditures at the time of the interview, a Tobit 
model is implemented.  
 
4 This function appears in Deaton (1997, pp. 268-69) and is derived from a cost function, c(u,p,n) = nθα(p)uβ(p) where  u is the utility 
function, θ is a parameter to control for scale economies in the household, α(p) is linearly homogeneous and  β(p) is  homogeneous of degree 
zero in prices. Considering that ∂lnc/∂pi = wi and taking lnα(p) = Σαklnpk  and lnβ(p) = Σβklnpk the system of demands will take the form of 
a Working equation wi = αi* + βiln(x/nθ) = αi* + βiln(x/n) + βi(1 - θ)lnn, which is the equation that is being used here. 
   
In order to control for differences in prices we consider just one price in every locality, 
but we allow the price to vary among clusters as in Deaton’s (1997) model. We require 
localities to be as small and as distant from each other as possible, since each locality has just 
one price for goods related to health. Besides localities we use sample expansion factors to 
expand from the sample to the population in order to build as many clusters as possible5. As 
these clusters come from a sample and we want to extend the results to the population, we use 
a random effects model and consider the clusters to be randomly distributed in the sample. 
The model is as follows: 
( ) ( ) 2 21 2 1 2 3
1
ln ln lnch ch ch ch
h h
J
cjh
j ch c h
j ch
x xw nn n
n
z u
n
α β β η η η
γ δ ε
=
⎡ ⎤= + + + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎛ ⎞+ + ⋅ + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑
rem rem
                                                
       (2) 
 
In this model c represent different localities, uc different prices, and rem are the 
remittances, which are censored at zero in 95.6% of the cases and cannot be included as logs. 
The introduction of uc is implemented as a random effects model. Our null hypothesis is that 
η2 and η3 are equal to 0, implying that the proportion of health expenditures is constant with 
respect to remittances and that the changes are generated by factors such as household 
expenditure per capita, size of the household and scale effects, groups of different sex and age 
or other control factors. In order to compare the effect of remittances rem on health 
expenditures with the effect of other transfers, we run a similar regression using transfers 
from institutions by substituting remittances for transfers from institutions insti.  
 
5 The ENIGH has information about 32 Federal States, 503 localities, 4 stratus (size of the locality) and 1,687 expansion factors that could be 
repeated in different States, localities or stratus. This information allows us to distinguish 3074 clusters or ultimate sampling units which for 
22,595 observed households gives us an average of 7.4 households by cluster.  
   
To analyze the existence of different effects of remittances if the household has access 
to employment’s medical insurance, AEMI, we include this variable by itself, and also interact 
it with expenditure per member and with remittances as shown in equation (3). 
( ) ( )
( )
2
2
1 1 2 1 2 3 2
3 4
1
ln ln ln
*ln *
ch ch ch ch ch
ch ch
J
cjh
ch ch ch j ch c h
ch j ch
x xw n remn n
nxASMI ASMI rem z un n
α β β η η η α
α α γ δ
=
⎡ ⎤= + + + + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎛ ⎞+ + + + ⋅ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑
rem ASMI
ε+
    (3) 
 
Marginal values.  The proportion of health expenditure is censored at zero in 35% of 
the households and for this reason we follow a Tobit model characterized as follows: 
wch = β’Xch + εch
wch* = 0 if wch  ≤0         and          wch* = wch if  wch > 0     (4) 
 
In the next section we are interested in obtaining E[wch|Xch] for the total population, 
and comparing our results with those of the case E[wch|Xch, wch > 0] and those of a GLS 
model (an OLS model plus random effects in order to control for changes in prices). When we 
consider the marginal values ∂w/∂X for the case E[wch|Xch]  the unobservable results for wch ≤ 
0 are allowed and we interpret them as measuring the distance to a threshold to make 
expenditures in health or as part of a utility function because they are important for social 
policy. For example, the relationship between poverty and the probability of making health 
expenditures is well documented, as in Wagstaff (2002), Hernández et al. (2005), Ochoa et al. 
(1999), and Suarez (2000)  The relationship between both marginal values, those generated by 
E[wch|Xch] and those by E[wch|Xch, wch > 0], is given by β’φ(X’β/σε) where X’β  are the 
estimated values and φ  is the standard normal distribution. If what is desired to know is the 
sales of a medical service or product it could be more relevant to use E[wch|Xch, wch > 0]. But 
even in this sales case, Debb and Trivedi (2002) have shown that for the case of counting data 
   
on expenditures on health a threshold model is preferred to a two-step model that separates 
the cases wch = 0 and wch > 0.  
Exogeneity. To study the problem of exogeneity of remittances, as 4.5 % of cases 
receive remittances generating a censored variable, we study the problem of exogeneity in 
two parts: as a dichotomous variable to consider the effect through the probability of 
receiving remittances, and as a continuous variable to consider the effects through quantities 
received. In the first case we consider the relationship between the probability of making 
health expenditures and the one of receiving remittances with two probit regressions, one for 
the decision to make health expenditures z1w  and one for receiving remittances z2rem: 
z1w = αw´vw + uw         (5) 
z2rem = αr´vr + ur
 
The variable z1w refers to the household decision of making expenditures on health 
greater than zero (1 if w > 0, 0 if w =0), z2rem to the fact of receiving remittances also greater 
than zero (1 if rem > 0, 0 if rem =0). We first run the regressions6 for z1w and z2rem to see if 
there is a significant correlation between uw and ur and we find a Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient ρ1w,2rem of 0.074 significantly different from zero.  
To test the exogeneity of remittances as a continuous variable we use the procedure of 
Smith and Blundell (1986) as discussed by Greene (2002, p. E21-77). We run an OLS 
regression on remittances and keep the residuals. Then we run the Tobit model for w and 
include these residuals as an additional right hand side variable, and we find that the 
coefficient of the residuals is not significantly different from zero. We conclude that remittances as 
a continuous variable was exogenous.  Then, as an approximation and given the correlation between 
                                                 
6 The variables included for z1w and  z2rem are the geographic zone, size of the locality, access to employment’s 
medical insurance by the head of the household or the spouse, sex and marital status of the head of the 
household, hours worked by the family linear and squared, and the logarithms of total expenditure per member 
and of size of the household.  
 
   
uw and ur, we add the residuals of the z2rem equation to equation (3) and run the Tobit model for 
w, and find that they are positive and significantly different from zero. Since there is no way 
to think in using instrumental variable methods for this variable, we conclude that it is 
important to include those residuals as an additional variable to diminish the problem of 
exogeneity. We also try to manage this problem as a problem of self selection in an equation 
for remittances, but the obtained inverse mills-ratio or Heckman’s lambda was not 
significantly different from zero. This implied that it was not convenient to use that 
methodology to obtain corrected estimates.  
The ENIGH does not give information about sickness in the household. We consider 
that the presence of sickness, through changes in hours worked, could originate changes in 
expenditure per member in the household, and that this would originate a relationship 
between one explanatory variable and the random term. Besides, sickness in the household 
could affect hours worked and remittances.  To avoid this endogeneity problem we include 
the variable “Family Hours Worked”, both linear and squared as an explanatory variable. The 
variables are subject to the critic of Angrist and Krueger (1999) in that they are related to 
expenditures per household member and they could be generating a bias when we try to 
control for a possible inexistent sickness bias. For this reason we compare the results with the 
variables related to hours worked included and without them and verify that the changes are 
small as we will see in the discussion of the results for equation (2) in Table 4. 
 
4. Variables and results 
In order to control for the age and sex of the members of the household, we define ten 
groups, one for people 0 - 6 years of age and one for 66 or more,  and four more groups for 
each sex according to the age groups 7 – 15, 16 – 24,  25 -54 and 55 – 65. With these groups 
we define the composition of the family as nj/n, where j represents each of the ten groups, nj 
   
the number of people in group j and nj/n the proportion of people in each group.  We also 
utilize control variables z as sex and marital status of the head of the household, four divisions 
by geographic zone, and four divisions by size of the locality. 
We present the mean and standard deviation of the variables of interest in Table 3.  In 
the table, w is the proportion of household’s monetary expenditures in health, lnx/n is the 
natural logarithm of monetary expenditure per member of the household, lnn represents the 
logarithm of the size of the household, rem represents remittances, insti are transfers from 
institutions to the household, AEMIhs is the fraction of households whose head or spouse 
have access to employment’s medical insurance and AEMIh is the fraction of households 
whose at least one member has access to employment’s medical insurance. The number of 
households in the sample is 22,547 which represent 25 million households. The Table also 
shows the means and standard deviations of the variables separated by whether the household 
has access to employment’s medical insurance or not.  The proportion of monetary 
expenditures on health is 3.3%, but it is 2.3% for households with access to employment’s 
medical insurance and 3.8% for households without access. Households without access to 
employment’s medical insurance have a higher proportion of total expenditure devoted to 
health, a lower expenditure per capita, a smaller household size, and higher transfers from 
remittances and from institutions. 
   
Table 3 
Sample Means and Standard Deviations 
 All Access to EMI No access to EMI 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
w 0.033 0.073 0.023 0.052 0.038 0.081 
x 20,937 27,236 27,906 26,442 17,126 26,907 
lnx/n 8.27 0.97 8.66 0.82 8.05 0.97 
(lnx/n)2 69.31 16.12 75.64 14.48 65.83 15.92 
lnn 1.27 0.55 1.30 0.46 1.25 0.59 
rem 414 16,100 80 1,351 598 20,033 
rem2/106 260 38,300 1.8 93 402 47,700 
Insti 340 1410 127 917 456 1608 
Insti2 2.1 54.2 0.9 21.2 2.8 65.5 
AEMIh  0.45 0.50     
AEMIhs 0.35 0.48     
 
Table 4 
Regression results for equation (2). 
Effects of variables  in the share of health related consumption  
 Variables (1) (2) (3) 
constant -0.340 -0.333 -0.345 
 (-10.14) (-9.97) (-10.30) 
lnx/n 0.068 0.066 0.070 
 (8.58) (8.36) (8.74) 
(lnx/n)2 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 (-5.64) (-5.26) (-5.76) 
lnn 0.022 0.026 0.026 
 (11.90) (12.02) (11.83) 
rem 1.82E-06  1.68E-06 
 (5.30)  (5.74) 
rem2 -6.46E-13  -5.85E-13 
 (-8.58)  (-4.76) 
insti  1.20E-06  
  (1.62)  
insti2  -2.32E-11  
  (-1.27)  
Fam. hours worked   -1.32E-04 
   (-3.59) 
(Fam. hours worked)2   3.54e-07 
   (2.55) 
Log likehood 8382.45 8341.68 8498.62 
sigma σε 0.094 0.095 0.094 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Number of observations; 22547, censored: 7920, uncensored 14,627; 
number of groups 3,074.Other control variables used are sex and marital status of the head of the 
family, 9 variables for composition of sex and age of the members of the household, 3 for geographic 
zone and 3 for size of the locality.  
 
Table 4 presents the results of the Tobit models of equation (2) which allows us to 
compare the effects of small changes in the models, the effect of changing the variable rem 
   
(column 1) for the variable insti (column 2), and the effect of adding the control variable 
Family hours worked  linear and squared (column 3). Column (1) shows that there is a 
positive effect of remittances on a household’s health expenditure: higher remittances to the 
household are accompanied by a larger share of expenditure on health. On the other hand, 
although we also find a positive relationship between transfers from institutions and health 
expenditure in column (2), the coefficient is much smaller than the one for remittances and is 
not statistically significant. Transfers from remittances appear to have a stronger targeting 
effect on health expenditures compared to transfers from Institutions.  
The third column shows the effects of adding the variable Family hours worked. The 
sign of the coefficient is negative in the mean (76.5 hours) as expected: sickness in the family 
decreases hours worked and increases the share of health expenditures. The difference in the 
coefficients of lnx/n of columns (1) and (3) is not significantly different from zero, nor the 
difference of the coefficients related to rem.  The presence of the variables related to Family 
Hours Worked decrease the size of the coefficient of rem as expected. As discussed before, 
since this decrement is small we include this control variable in the regressions in Table 5.  
In Table 5 we present the results of the regressions using equation (3), where the 
variable access to employment’s medical insurance (AEMI) by the head of the household or 
their spouse is included. Column (1) gives the results including the residuals estimated in 
equation (5) for remittances, e2rem and column (2) gives the results without those residuals. In 
column (3) we re-run the same regression but with an alternative definition of households 
with/without medical insurance as a robustness check. In particular, in this specification we 
define a household as having access to employment’s medical insurance if at least one 
member has access to EMI. In column (4) the GLS results are presented, where we still 
control with clusters for differences in prices. All the results show that remittances have a 
positive impact on the fraction of health expenditures by the household, but as expected, this 
   
effect is significantly smaller or even negative for households with employment’s medical 
insurance. This result points to the lack of insurance as one of the reasons families receive 
remittances. Across all regressions, the coefficients of lnn are positive, indicating that when 
the household increases its number of members the proportion of expenditure on health also 
increases, which implies that there are no returns to scale for health expenditure. 
The unexplained residuals in equation (5) for the probability of obtaining remittances 
e2rem affect positively the share of health expenditures. If we do not include this variable, the 
coefficient of remittances of column (2) would be larger than the one of column (1). In any 
case the differences between the coefficients of both columns are small. Column (3) shows 
that our results are robust to the alternative definition of households with employment’s 
medical insurance. We still find a positive relationship between remittances and the fraction 
of the household’s expenditure on health that is much smaller for households with 
employment’s medical insurance. The coefficient of AEMI in column (3) is smaller in 
absolute value than that of column (1) and this is consistent with the hypothesis that 
measuring AEMI with the households that have at least one member with access to it should 
have a weaker effect on the share of health expenditure. Comparing columns (1) and (3) we 
also find that the differences between coefficients are small. However, as most of the 
variables are in linear and quadratic form or related to other variables, we also consider taking 
mean values to analyze the results. 
The estimated regression refers to E[w|X]. In order to compare these results with the 
coefficients of E[w|X, w>0] we have to multiply them by β’φ(X’β/σε) where X’β are the 
predicted values at the mean. We substitute the values obtained in Column (1) and we obtain 
that  φ(X’β/σε) is φ(0.00593/.094)) which is equal to 0.525. To obtain these marginal effects 
of E[w|X, w>0]  we multiplied the β coefficients of column (1) by that value and obtained 
column (5). 
   
Table 5 
Regression Results for Equation (3) 
Effects of variables  in the share of health related consumption 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
constant -0.416 -0.420 -0.432 -0.053 -0.218 
 (-11.94) (-12.06) (-12.43) (-2.38)  
lnx/n 0.084 0.085 0.087 0.017 0.044 
 (10.00) (10.13) (10.4) (3.09)  
(lnx/n)2 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 
 (-6.86) (-7.03) (-7.17) (-0.71)  
lnn 0.024 0.024 0.030 0.011 0.013 
 (11.09) (10.94) (13.69) (7.15)  
rem 9.46E-07 1.69E-06 9.700E-07 1.07E-06 4.97E-07 
 (2.50) (5.45) (2.51) (3.84)  
rem2 -2.81E-13 -5.88E-13 -2.910E-13 -3.38E-13 -1.48E-13 
 (-1.78) (-4.52) (-1.8) (-2.91)  
AEMI -0.069 -0.070 -0.058 -0.013 -0.036 
 (-4.44) (-4.54) (-4.03) (-1.2)  
lnx/n*AEMI 0.005 0.006 0.004 1.790E-05 0.003 
 (2.97) (3.08) (2.32) (0.01)  
rem*AEMI -1.790E-06 -1.94E-06 -1.070E-06 -1.520E-06 -9.38E-07 
 (-2.09) (-2.26) (-1.54) (-2.43)  
e2rem .0142588  0.014 .0055816  0.007 
 (3.43)  (3.39) (1.86 )  
      
# of observations 22547 22547 22547 22547  
Log likehood 8507.71 8501.82 8538.67   
sigma se 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.071  
Notes:t-statistics in parentheses. Number of observations; 22547, censored: 7920, uncensored 14,627; number of groups 
3,074. See notes to Table 4 for other control variables. 
 
The main results for expenditures and remittances appear in Table 6 which shows the 
effects on the means, and the elasticities of health expenditure on remittances and on total 
expenditures.  The effects on the means are estimated through equation (3). For example, for 
remittances we estimate ∂w/∂rem in the mean of rem and similarly7 for ∂w/∂ln(x/n). The 
estimated elasticities refer to the change in quantity of health goods with respect to 
remittances and total expenditures, respectively. To test if the effect on the means, the partial 
                                                 
7 The effects on means are estimated through equation (3). For example, for remittances we will 
have: 2 3 42w rem ASMIrem η η α∂ = + +∂ . The elasticities of health expenditure with respect to total 
monetary expenditures (constant size of the household)  and with respect to remittances, ex and eR, are defined 
as:                                        
( )lnln ln1;
ln lnx R
w
xq q rem w remne e
x w rem w re
∂
∂∂ ∂= = + = = ⋅ +∂ ∂ m x
∂
∂  where the 
term rem/x is the expenditure effect because it assumes ∂x/∂rem = 1.                         
   
derivatives evaluated at the means, were significantly different from zero, we use the 
information of equation (3) and the mean values of rem and lnx/n of Table 3.  Table 6 
presents results for the columns (1), (4) and (5) of Table 5 for the Tobit, GLS and corrected 
Tobit results respectively.  
 
Table 6 
Effects on the means and elasticities 
  Effects on the means Elasticities 
 Concept 
Access to 
EMI 
No access to 
EMI 
Access to 
EMI 
No access to 
EMI 
Tobit results (Column 1 Table 5). 
 Remi -8.44E-07 9.46E-07 0.009 0.032 
 Expenditure 0.032 0.027 1.971 1.810 
Prob > chi2 Remi 0.770** 0.000**   
 Expenditure 0.000** 0.000**   
GLS results (column 4 Table 5) 
 Remi -4.50E-07 1.07E-06 0.014 0.033 
 Expenditure 0.013 0.013 1.387 1.386 
Prob > chi2 Remi 0.477* 0.000*   
 Expenditure 0.467 0.478   
Corrected Tobit (column 5 Table 5) 
 remi -4.41E-07 4.97E-07 0.014 0.026 
 Expenditure 0.030 0.027 1.921 1.830 
The coefficients with and without AEMI are significantly different at 1% level (**), 5% level (*) 
 
Nonlinear χ2 tests are presented for the results on the means and the asterisks denote 
significant differences on mean coefficients with/without AEMI. The results for the effect on 
the mean for remittances have a positive sign if the household does not have access to EMI 
and a negative sign if it has access. This implies that remittances have a target effect of 
increasing the proportion of health expenditures at households without EMI, but that this 
effect is not found for households with access to EMI. The result is obtained when 
maintaining constant variables such as total expenditure, size of the household, proportion of 
old and young people, prices, and so on. Besides, the effects on the means are significantly 
different from zero for households without access to EMI and not significant for households 
with access to EMI. The resulting remittances elasticities are similar for the Tobit and 
   
corrected Tobit cases and are higher for the GLS results. They are about .03 for households 
without access to EMI.  
In the case of households without AEMI, the Tobit results can be read as follows. If 
we take the mean values of Table 3, rem = 414, w = 0.033, x = 20,937, gives us health 
expenditure of 690.92, and assuming an increase in remittances of 41.4, or 10 percent, we will 
obtain an increase on expenditure of 41.4/20937 %. The effect through remittances with an 
elasticity of .032 will be an increase in health expenditures of 2.211, and the effect through 
total expenditure with an elasticity of 1.81 will be of 2.473 adding to a total of 4.684. As the 
original increase in remittances was of 41.4 these findings indicate that for households 
without AEMI an average of 11.3 percent of remittances will be destined to health 
expenditures.  For households with AEMI the expenditure and remittances elasticities are 1.91 
and 0.009 respectively, generating and increase in health expenditures of 3.315, about 8 
percent of the increase in remittances. This implies that around 10% of changes in remittances 
are devoted to health expenditure.  
Table 5 shows that the coefficients of remittances in both cases, Tobit and GLS, are 
significantly different for people with/without AEMI. Note that the three kinds of 
methodologies, Tobit, GLS and Corrected Tobit, give the same results for the remittances 
variable. This suggests our results are robust to the econometric technique used. 
The results for elasticities of health consumption to total expenditure in the Tobit 
model for both kinds of marginal values, the Tobit model E[w|X] and the corrected Tobit 
E[w|X, w>0], are around 1.8 – 1.9; higher for households with AEMI which is consistent with 
a lower share of expenditure and higher substitution possibilities for these households. 
However, the results for the GLS give lower health consumption expenditure elasticities, 
around 1.38 but not significantly different from one, and an inability to distinguish between 
households with/without AEMI.  Even where there are arguments in favor of modeling 
   
together consumers and non-consumers as in the GLS model (see for example Deaton (1997, 
p. 92)), our results for the Tobit and corrected Tobit models suggest that these are the correct 
specifications when considering E[w|X, w>0] for health as a private good and as E[w|X] 
when considering public policy.  
One of the most important features of this model is that it controls for changes in 
prices through 3,074 different clusters. The control for prices through random effects makes 
difficult the study of the problem of heterogeneity. Our intent in this analysis was to control 
for this problem through the inclusion of different kinds of variations, as composition of the 
family, total expenditure, scale effects, and so on. However, Table 7 in the appendix presents 
the relationship β/σ for the probit and tobit models, and shows that with the exception of the 
control variable for expenditures per member Family Hours Worked, the most important 
variables have the same sign.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the relationship between remittances and the households’ 
consumption on health, using data from Mexico for the year 2004.  We study this link as a 
relationship between remittances and the proportion of total expenditure that goes to health 
expenses. We control for the household’s total monetary expenditure, for composition and 
size of the family, for marital status and sex of the head of the household, for region and size 
of the locality. The most important control variable is the one related to household’s 
expenditure. As remittances are a part of total household expenditure, a positive relationship 
with the proportion of the household’s expenditure on health would indicate that the 
proportion devoted to expenditure on health is increasing with remittances, and so we can 
conclude that health expenditure is a target of remittances. 
   
The relationship was studied for households with access to employment’s medical 
insurance and for households without it. We found a statistically significant positive 
relationship between remittances and the household’s expenditure on health for households 
without access to employment’s medical insurance.  In order to compare the effects of 
institutional transfers with the effects of remittances, we also studied the relationship of 
institutional transfers to the households and the proportion of expenditure on health, but we 
did not find a statistically significant relationship. The positive relationship between 
remittances and the proportion of the household’s health expenditures together with the lack 
of a similar relationship for institutional transfers suggest that it is mainly remittances, and not 
institutional transfers, that contribute to a household’s share of expenditure on health.  The 
results are also consistent when the definition of access to employment’s medical insurance is 
changed.  
We also estimated both kinds of marginal results for the Tobit model, E[w|X] for 
public policy and E[w|X, w>0] for private applications, and we found that the results for 
remittances showed consistency, generating similar elasticities of health consumption in 
relation to remittances.  This consistency was also found when we considered a GLS model.  
Our estimations suggest that the impact on health related consumption of an increase in 
remittances is about 11.3 % of the increase in remittances for households without access to 
employment’s medical service, and of 8 % for households with access to employment’s 
medical service. 
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Appendix 
Table 7 
Heterocedasticity: β/σ for the Probit and Tobit models 
 Probit Tobit 
constant -16.14 -11.94 
lnx/n 13.01 10.00 
(lnx/n)2 -9.58 -6.86 
lnn 13.19 11.09 
rem 0.69 2.50 
rem2 -0.33 -1.78 
AEMI -6.18 -4.44 
lnx/n*AEMI 4.92 2.97 
rem*AEMI -1.57 -2.09 
e2 3.66 3.43 
Hours worked by the family 1.73 -2.33 
(Hours worked by the family)2 -0.89 1.40 
n06/n  9.13 1.03 
n0715m/n -2.34 -10.96 
n0715w/n -2.34 -11.19 
n1624m/n -4.24 -11.84 
n1624w/n -0.86 -8.34 
n2554m/n -5.92 -13.67 
n2554w/n 1.93 -4.56 
n5564m/n -5.04 -7.56 
n5564w/n 2.92 -0.34 
marital status of the head -1.59 -2.02 
sex of the head 2.84 2.35 
Geographic zone 1 -9.29 -7.29 
Geographic zone 2 1.19 2.79 
Geographic zone 3 3.78 3.94 
locality size (> 100,000) -5.27 -13.05 
locality size (15,000 – 99,999) -2.10 -5.21 
locality size (2,500 – 14,999) -1.52 -2.77 
 
